No. I. (H) Additional Article. HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having, in pursuance of his sincere desire to insure success to the enterprize concerted against France, determined, in case the circumstances should require it, to augment the forces which he has promised to bring into action, to an hundred and eighty thousand men, his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland promises and engages to pay, in that case, to his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, for the troops which he may thus add to the 115,000 already agreed upon, a subsidy and a Premiere mise en Champagne, at the same rate as is agreed by the fifth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert established between his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias the 30th March-11th April 1805. This additional Article shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted word for word in the aforementioned Concert, and shall be ratified by the two High Contracting Powers; and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the space of ten weeks, or sooner, if possible. In witness whereof, &c. &c. (L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON Gower. (L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI. (L. S.) NICOLAS DE NOVOS SILZOFF. No. I. (I.) Additional Article of the Treaty of Concert, signed at St. Petersburgh, the 11th April, 1805. HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, purposing to concert measures with the Court of Vienna, by which considerable Russian armies may be approximated to the frontiers of France, by crossing the Austrian and Prussian territories, while it is declared that the object of these movements is to obtain securities for the continent, promises and engages to his Britannic Majesty, in his own name and in that of his allies, that, should even circumstances require, that at the moment when the Russian troops began their march, they should declare that this movement was in no way connected with an existing Concert with his Britannic Majesty, but that the powers of the continent reclaim the fulfilment by France of her immediate engagements with them, yet as soon as the war shall have broken out, they will no longer pursue a particular object, but that which has been determined by the Concert of the 30th March-11th April, with all the clauses incorporated with it: In return for this assurance, his Britannic Majesty promises and engages, in the first place, to fulfil towards the Emperor of all the Russias, the stipulations of the abovementioned Concert, in all their parts, as soon as the war shall have broken out between Russia and France, and especially to furnish for the Russian troops the subsidies agreed upon, payable from the day on which they shall have quitted the frontiers of the empire, and moreover the three months stipulated subsidy under the name of Premiere mise en Campagne: with this condition, nevertheless, that however long may be the term between the epoch of the departure of the Russian troops from their frontiers, and that of the commencement of hostilities, his Britannic Majesty shall not be bound to pay to Russia for that interval more than six months subsidy at the most, the Premiere mise en Campagne being therein comprised. In the second place, to fulfil, with regard to Austria, all the stipulations of the abovementioned Concert, and especially all that relates to the subsidies, as soon as the ambassador of his Imperial and Royal Majesty shall have signed the act of accession of his court; and lastly, in the third place, to pay in the like manner to the other allies of Russia, who shall assist in this enterprize (except in the case of special arrangements), the subsidies which have been allotted for them by the abovementioned Concert, and on the conditions therein specified. This additional Article shall have the same force and validity, as if it were inserted word for word in the abovementioned Concert, and shall be ratified by the Two High Contracting Parties, and the ratifications exchanged at St. Petersburgh, in the space of six weeks, or sooner, if possible. In faith of which, &c. &c. (L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON Gower. (L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSĶI, (No. II.) Extract from a dispatch of Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated St. Petersburgh, 29th June, 1805. (No. 27.) MY LORD, THE annexation of the Ligurian republic to the French empire, executed at the very moment when a Russian plenipotentiary was expected in France, charged with propositions of which the professed object had been the general arrangements of the affairs of Europe, is considered as so great an insult to both sovereigns, whose sentiments that plenipotentiary was empowered to declare, that his imperial majesty has judged under these circumstances, he could not consistently, with what is due to his own dignity, or to that of his august ally, permit M. Novossilzoff to proceed to fulfil the object of his mission. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER. The right hon. Lord Mulgrave, &c, Extract of a dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated Petersburgh, 22d July, 1805. (No. 30.) MY LORD, I WAS on the point of dispatching yesterday the messenger to England, when I received an invitation from Prince Czartoryski to a conference, in which he read to me some very important dispatches he had just received from Count Razoumofsky and General Winzingerode. By these it appears that the emperor of Germany is at last awakened to a sense of his true dignity, and the real interests of his empire; and that foreseeing the inevitability of war, he is determined not to leave to Bonaparte the choice of the moment to commence hostilities. The right hon. Lord Mulgrave, &c. &c. Extract of a dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated St. Petersburgh, 3d September, 1805. (No. 38.) MY LORD, THE last dispatches from the Russian ambassador at Vienna speak in strong terms of the warlike temper of that cabinet; certain communications had been made from Paris, which indicated a yielding disposition on the part of Bonaparte, but to these indications Count Cobentzel seems to attach no credit, and Count Razoumofsky represents that the present character of the Austrian ministry is a direct contrast to its former timidity and indicision, and that a firm conviction seems now to prevail at Vienna, that it is through war alone that any security can be obtained against the ambition and power of France. There is just ground for expecting, that his imperial and royal majesty, being persuaded that war is inevitable, may be induced not to wait the issue of the proposed negotiations with the French government, but that he will commence hostilities at the time when the superiority of the allied forces promises the best prospect of success. Towards the beginning of October, the Austrian army upon the Venetian frontier will be completely to its full establishment, and will without doubt be greatly superior in numbers to the French forces in Italy, and the Russian armies will be sufficiently advanced into the hereditary states to ensure their arrival upon the frontiers of Bavaria, before the French troops from the coast and the interior of France can reach the German empire; I have, therefore, in several conversations lately with Prince Czartorysky and Comte Stadion, urged the expediency of losing no time in beginning the war. The prince informs me, that he has already instructed Comte Razoumofsky to press this consideration upon the attention of the court of Vienna, but that he will not fail to repeat the instructions to the Russian ambassador. I have great satisfaction in observing the encreased energy and vigour of this court. The Emperor, foreseeing the possibility of Bonaparte effecting a large augmentation to the French army in consequence of the menaced attack by the allied powers, has resolved to be prepared to nicet such an effort, by a corresponding exertion on his part, and he has ordered a levy of four men out of every five hundred, which will produce above 150,000 men. A corps of above ten thousand men, under the command of his Imperial highness the Grand Duke Constantine, and composed chiefly of the garrison of St. Petersburgh, began their march towards the Prussian frontier on Thursday the 22d. The troops destined for Pomerania are ready for embarkation, and will probably sail in about six or eight days; they amount to twenty thousand men. No dispatches, however, have been received from M. Alopeus, who was charged to negotiate with the King of Sweden the necessary arrangements for the landing of the Russians at Stralsund, and the augmentation of the Swedish garrison at that port. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER. No. III. (A.) (Translation.) Plan of Operations proposed by the Court of Vienna. FRANCE, upon the new organization of her army, has on foot, 112 regiments of the line, 30 regiments of light infantry, 85 cavalry, 16 artillery, 404,828 men. 107,540 64,226 21,430 598,024 This number, with the addition of the different corps in Corsica and the islands, of 21 regiments of Dutch soldiers, II Swiss regiments, 18 auxiliary troops from Italy," and the Imperial guard, which consists of 15,000 men, makes a total of 651,964, the whole military force now on foot in France. These troops are for the greater part already on the war establishment. Any grand descent from England, upon the coast of France, with the probability of decided success, is scarcely to be expected. France may therefore venture to draw almost all her troops from her interior, and from her coasts. Besides, a well arranged national guard, in perfect discipline, would enable her to spare her troops of the line, even from where they had been employed in praserving domestic order and security. It follows, that France might employ 500,000 men in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. In opposition to that force, the 250,000 Austrians, and 115,000 Russians, stipulated in the last treaty, compose a total force, which is, in comparison, so much the less to he depended upon, because very little effective assistance is to be expected from the Swedes and the English. The following are the necessary conclusions from the statement. 1st. Considering this estimate, and the advantages which France enjoys in its geographical situation, whether for defence or for aggression, the maintenance of peace, till a more favourable conjuncture shall arise, seems to be infinitely desirable. 2d If, however, war should become inevitable, not only to ensure its success, but to avoid likewise evils more alarming than those of the present moment, it would become indispensibly necessary, that the allied courts should use their most vigorous efforts to oppose those of the enemy, and bring into efficiency means at least equal to theirs, if not superior. The military arrangements, the financial, and the general policy of the allies, must concur in putting forth those energies, by which alone we can hope to give success to our efforts. Ist. Military arrangements. This co-operation in these three branches could be of very little effect, if the Austrian armies should not come into the field more than 300,000 strong. The first of the papers subjoined shews, what would be the deficiencies to be supplied in the Imperial and Royal army, in recruiting, in appointments, and in remounting the cavalry, beisdes other augmentations, necessary to raise it from its present weak state, upon a peace establishment, to the number abovementioned; and, at the same time, to leave the number of troops requisite for service in the interior of the Monarchy, and for the observance of the movements of Prussia. The difficulties which strike upon a first view will appear still more considerable upon a due attention to the manner in which the Austrian troops are now distributed. The line formed to prevent the introduction of infectious disease, has indeed contributed to obviate, in part, that disadvantage, as it leaves the Venetian lominions of the empire no longer in danger of a surprise from the French. But, if it were necessary to take measures to oppose a great force to that which the enemy might bring against us from the interior of his dominions, then would dispositions the most prompt and vigorous be requisite, to the seasonable concentration of the Austrian troops which are, in great part, at a distance from the frontiers in danger, to put them upon the footing for war, and to bring them to act upon the points which are the most exposed. This first measure would require to be carried into effect with the greater activity, because it could not be expected that the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia should, from such a distance, arrive on the scene of action, till after the Austrian troops should have sustained the first attacks of the enemy. His Majesty will not be deterred by these great difficulties, if war should become unavoidable; he will, in that case, use his most strenuous endeavours to surmount every difficulty, and fulfil his engagements. But to give effect to this steady resolution, it is necessary; 2dly. That there should be adequate financial resources, and that the difficulties which present themselves under that head should be removed; the imperial court of St. Petersburgh has already been informed of the vast and necessary expenditure required to put the infantry, the cavalry, the carriages and artillery, the objects of the commiffaries' Department, the magazines and stores, in short, every thing belonging to the army, upon the full war establishment. The succour of fifteen millions of Florins, which has been asked from England for this primary service, is not more than one-half of what is actually wanted. The expense of each campaign of the last war was from one hundred |
