is entitled to the full benefit of any evidence adduced by the husband which creates such a bar, Timmings v. Timmings, 3 Hagg. 77; but a party relying on condonation as a bar should plead it, Ibid, 84.

Where adultery is pleaded by way of recrimination, and as a bar, it is not necessary to prove such strong facts against the plaintiff as would be required to convict the other party in a suit for divorce, Leicester v. Leicester, cited 1 Hagg. Con. 153, and quoted and the principle affirmed in Astley v. Astley, 1 Hagg 721.

It is not a good plea in bar to a petition for a dissolution of marriage that the respondent had been dismissed from a suit in the Arches' Court for a divorce a mensâ et thoro, for that suit was not de eadem re, and, therefore, this is not a case in which lis alibi pendens is a good plea; and this Court is not bound by the standing orders of the House of Lords, according to which a dissolution could not be obtained where the husband had failed to obtain a divorce a mensâ; and for the same reasons the pendency of an appeal from the Arches Court is not pleadable in such a case: Evans v. Evans and Robinson, 27 L. J., P. & M. 57.

Entering into a voluntary deed of separation and bringing an action upon that deed does not bar the wife of her remedy by separation nor bear unfavourably on her case: Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. 760.

Even where the husband and wife are separated under articles of agreement, the legal relation still exists, for such an understanding is not recognized by the law: Nash v. Nash, 1 Hagg. C. 142; Beeby v. Beeby, ib. (note), S. C. 1 Hagg. 789; Mortimer v. Mortimer, 2 Hagg. C. 318; Barker v. Barker, 2 Add. 285; Sullivan v. Sullivan, ib. 299, 303; Nash v. Nash, 1 Hagg. C. 143; Studdy v. Studdy, 28 L. J., P. & M. 44.

The wife may plead adultery in bar, for they are both in eodem delicto; but in a recrimination of cruelty the delictum is not the same: Chambers v. Chambers, 1 Hagg. C. 452.

A plea amounting to an allegation that the husband was morose, severe, inattentive, and negligent is no bar to an allegation of adultery on the part of the wife: Rogers v. Rogers, 2 Hagg. 73. Indifference, ill behaviour, or cruelty is not pleadable in a suit for adultery: Moorson v. Moorson, 3 Hagg. 92; but desertion may be, Coulthart v. Coulthart and Gouthwaite, 28 L. J., P. & M. 21, post 111.

Adultery, Incestuous.-This is a ground of dissolution of marriage, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 27.

Incest is the carnal intercourse of persons within the prohibited degrees, and as husband and wife are "one flesh," so persons related by consanguinity to the husband are related to the wife in the same degree by affinity, and vice

versâ, and whether the relationship be that of consanguinity or affinity, the prohibition is the same, Instit. Jur. Can. lib. 2, tit. 13.

And by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 27, it is defined to be "Adultery committed by a husband with a person with whom, if his wife were dead, he could not lawfully contract marriage, by reason of her being within the prohibited degrees."

Parent and child, and all lineal degrees are prohibited.

Amongst collaterals brother with sister, uncle or aunt with niece or nephew are prohibited intercourse.

Adultery, with Bigamy. This also is a ground of dissolution of marriage, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 27.

The definition of bigamy under the present law, 9 Geo. 4. c 31, s. 22, is, "if any person being married shall marry any other person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place in England or elsewhere, every such offender

Provided

shall be guilty of felony always, that nothing herein contained shall extend to any second marriage contracted out of England by any other than a subject of his Majesty, or to any person marrying a second time whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such person during the space of seven years then last past, and shall not have

been known by such person to be living within that time; or shall extend to any person who at the time of such marriage, shall have been divorced from the bond of such first marriage, or to any person whose former marriage shall have been declared void by the sentence of any court of competent jurisdiction."

And by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 27, it is "The marriage of any person being married, during the life of the former husband or wife whether the second marriage shall have taken place within the dominions of her Majesty or elsewhere."

It does not appear to be necessary that the offender should have been convicted; but the petitioner should prove the fact of both marriages, the identity of the party-(see “Identity," post.), and that the first marriage was a legal one: Reg. v. Chadwick, 11 Q. B. 17; Smith v. Huson, 1 Phill. 254; R. v. Jacob, 1 Moo, 140; but it is immaterial whether the second marriage were a valid marriage or not, if the fact of a marriage be proved: Reg. v. Baum, 1 Cox C. C. 34.

And the marriage of an idiot or lunatic, not in a lucid interval, is for this purpose void : 1 Russell on Crime, by Greaves, 216.

After proof of the first marriage the second wife is a competent witness to prove the fact of the second marriage, or any other fact, 1 East, P. C. 469.

The adultery must be proved, as ante; and it seems bigamy must be proved, and a conviction for bigamy will not suffice, March v. March, 28 L. J., P. & M. 30.

And semble, per Pollock, C. B. that the adultery must be proved to have been committed with the same person as the bigamy, Horne v. Horne, 27. L. J., P. & M. 30.

Adultery, with Bigamy-The Defence.-It is a good defence to an indictment for bigamy, and therefore in this suit, to show that there had been an absence for more than seven years; and it would appear that the husband is not bound to use diligence to inform himself of her whereabouts: R. v. Jones, Carr. & M. 614, per Cresswell, J. But at the Liverpool Winter Assize, 1858, Hill, J., left the whole question to the jury, Reg. v. Matthews, MSS.

It is also good to set up a previous dissolution of the first marriage; but not merely a judicial separation or divorce a mensâ ; and these must have been pronounced in England, or if pronounced abroad, on grounds on which a dissolution would be liable to be decreed in England: Reg. v. Lolley, Russ. and Ry. 237.

Also, if the marriage has been declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction, where the question has been directly decided.-See Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tri. 355.

And lastly, that the defendant is not a subject