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ABSOLUTE SECURITY POLICIES,

UNFORFEITABLE, UNCONDITIONAL,

AND UNCHALLENGEABLE,

ISSUED BY THE

London and County Banking Company.

(ESTABLISHED 1836.)

PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE Subscribed Capital, £2,500,000 in 50,000 Shares of £50 each; Paid-up Capital, £985,356;

COMPANY,

62, LUDGATE-HILL, LONDON, E.C.

The Directors of this Company, in deference to an objection not unfrequently urged by persons invited to assure, that the ordinary mode of Life Assurance is in their opinion defective or uncertain, by reason of the operation of the customary conditions, have resolved to promulgate the present tables, and to issue Assurances under them which shall be absolutely Unforfeitable, Unconditional, and Unchallengeable.

For the reason referred to, many persons hesitate or decline to assure on the ground that, in the event of inability or unwillingness to continue payment of their premiums, the Assurance will become forfeited. To this class of the public the system now introduced will especially commend itself, being entirely free from all conditions of forfeiture on account of non-payment of premium, or from any other cause whatever; while at the same time it absolutely guarantees at decease, even when a default is made in payment of the premium, a fixed sum in respect of every premium paid, bearing the same proportion to the total amount assured as the number of premiums actually paid may bear to the whole number originally contracted to be paid.

Besides this important advantage, every policy will expressly state what sum can at any time be withdrawn on the discontinuance of the Assurance.

The Assured will thus always have the option of retaining either an ascertained tixed sum payable at decease, or, in case of need, of withdrawing a certain amount, according to the duration of the Policy, such amounts being set forth on every Policy, and rendering unnecessary any future reference to the Company on these points, as is the case with ordinary Assurances.

Creditors assuring the lives of debtors will appreciate this feature as one greatly protective of their interests, and it will likewise commend itself to bankers, capitalists, and others who are in the habit of making advances collaterally secured by Life Policies, as they can at any time learn, by mere inspection, the exact value, either immediate or reversionary, of a Policy of this description.

Every Policy issued on this plan will be without any condi tions as to voyaging, foreign residence, or other usual limitations. By this freedom from restrictions of all kinds, the objections before referred to will be entirely removed, and the Policies will become at once positively valuable as actual securities.

In addition to the foregoing statement of advantages, the number of premiums is strictly defined. The longest term provided for is twenty-five years, and the shortest five years, as shown by the Tables. Thus, bankers, creditors, and others holding Policies of this class as security, may always know the utmost amount they may be called upon to advance so as to maintain the full benefit of the Assurances a matter of great importance where Policies are held as collateral security. It is only necessary to add that, as a consequence of the Policies under these Tables being unforfeitable and unconditional, they will also be unchallengeable on any ground whatever. They may therefore be aptly termed Absolute Security Policies.

The Prudential Assurance Company possesses an income of 215,0007. a-year; its position is unquestionable and it obtains the largest amount of new business of any office in the kingdom.

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The outstanding sums assured by this Company, with the Bonuses accrued thereon, amounting to about 2,800,0007., and the Assets, consisting entirely of Investments in first-class securities, amount to upwards of 950,00OZ.

The Assurance Reserve Fund alone is equal to more than nine times the premium income.

It will hence be seen that ample Security is guaranteed to the policy holders. Attention is invited to the prospectus of the company, from which it will appear that all kinds of assurances may be effected on the most moderate terms and the most liberal conditions.

The company also grants annuities and endowments. Prospectuses may be obtained at the offices as above, and of

the agents throughout the kingdom.

ANDREW BADEN, Actuary and Manager.

NATHANIEL ALEXANDER, Esq.
THOS. TYRINGHAM BERNARD, Esq.
PHILIP PATTON BLYTH, Esq.
JOHN WILLIAM BURMESTER, Esq.

Reserve Fund, £485,356.

Directors.

THOMAS STOCK COWIE, Esq. JOHN FLEMING, Esq. FREDERICK FRANCIS, Esq. FREDERICK HARRISON, Esq. Chief

General Manager. WILLIAM MCKEWAN, Esq. Assistant General Manager.-WILLIAM HOWARD, ESq. Inspectors of Branches.-H. J. LEMON, Esq., and C. SHERRING, ESq.

A

LORD ALFRED HERVEY.
WILLIAM CHAMPION JONES, Esq.
JAMES MORLEY, Esq.
WILLIAM NICOL, Esq.

Inspector.-W. J. NORFOLK, Esq.
Chief Accountant.-JAMES GRAY, Esq.
Secretary-F. CLAPPISON, Esq.

HEAD OFFICE-21, LOMBARD-STREET.

T the ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING of the PROPRIETORS, held on Thursday, the 4th February, 1869, at the City Terminus Hotel, Cannon-street Station, the following REPORT for the

year ending the 31st December, 1868, was read by the Secretary. William Nicol, Esq., in the Chair. The Directors, in presenting to the Proprietors the Balance-sheet of the Bank for the half-year ending the 31st December last, have the pleasure to report that, after paying interest to customers and all charges, allowing for rebate, and making provision for bad and doubtful debts, the net profits amount to £84,649. 188. 5d. This sum, added to £4092 38. 4d., brought forward from the last account, produces a total of £83,742 18. 9d.

The usual Dividend of 6 per cent. for the half-year is recommended, together with a Bonus of 24 per cent., both free of income-tax, which will absorb £82,924 168. 11d., and leave £5817 48. 10d. to be carried forward to profit and loss new account. The Dividend for the whole year 1868 will thus be 164 per cent.

The directors have to announce the election of Lord Alfred Hervey, as a Director, in the room of the Right Honourable Hugh C. E. Childers, M.P., who has accepted office in the present Administration, the election of James Morley, Esq., in the room of E. W. T. Hamilton, Esq., M.P., who retired on account of ill-health, and the election of Thomas Stock Cowie, Esq., in the room of J. E. Anderson, Esq., whose removal to reside in the West of England compelled his retirement.

The Directors retiring by rotation are-John William Burmester, Esq., John Fleming, Esq., and William Champion Jones, Esq., who, being eligible, offer themselves for re-election.

The Dividend and Bonus (together £114s. per Share, free of income-tax, will be payable at the Head Office, or at any of the Branches, on and after Monday, the 15th inst. BALANCE SHEET OF THE LONDON AND COUNTY BANKING COMPANY, DEC. 31, 1868.

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234,156 3 6

By liabilities of customers for drafts accepted by the Bank (as per contra)

3,242,930 14 3

238,248 6 10

12,673,417 2 8

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To gross profit for the half-year, after making provision for bad and doubtful debts...

BIR

By salaries and all other expenses at

head office and branches, including

income tax on profits and salaries

PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT.

£17,414,680 4 2

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The foregoing report having been read by the Secretary, the following resolutions were proposed and unanimously adopted:

1. That the report be received and adopted, and printed for the use of the shareholders.
2. That a dividend of 6 per cent., together with a bonus of 25 per cent., both free of income tax, be
declared for the half-year ending 31st December, 1868, payable on and after Monday, the 15th instant,
and that the balance of £5817 48. 10d. be carried forward to profit aud loss new account.

3. That John William Burmester, Esq., be re-elected a Director of this Company; that John Fleming,
Esq., be re-elected a Director of this Company; that William Champion Jones, Esq., be re-elected &
Director of this Company.

4. That William Norman, Richard Hinds Swaine, and Whitbread Tomson, Esqrs., be elected Auditors
for the current year.
5. That the thanks of this Meeting be given to the Board of Directors for the able manner in which they
have conducted the affairs of the Company.
6. That the thanks of this meeting be presented to the Auditors of the Company for their services
during the past year.

7. That the thanks of this Meeting be presented to William McKawau, Ecq., to the Chief Inspecter, to the Chief Accountant, to the Secretary, and to all the Branch Managers and other Officers of the Bank, for the zeal and ability with which they have discharged their respective duties. (Signed) W. NICOL, Chairman. The Chairman having quitted the Chair, it was resolved, and carried unanimously8. That the cordial thanks of this meeting be presented to William Nicol, Esq., for his able and (Signed) W. CHAMPION JONES, Deputy Chairman.

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LONDON and COUNTY BANKING COMPANY. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that & DIVIDEND on the Capital of the Company, at the rate of 6 per Cent. for the half-year ending December 31, 1668, with a BONUS of 24 per cent., will be paid to the Proprietors, either at the Head Office, 21, Lember street, or at any of the Coripany's Branch Banks, on and after MONDAY, the 15th inst. By order of the Board, 21, Lombard-street, Feb. 5.1869. W. MOKEWAN, General Manager.

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Subscribers and Advertisers are requested to make their Cheques and Post-office Orders payable to Mr. HORACE Cox, the latter at the Strand Office.

The LAW TIMES goes to press on Thursday evening, that it may be received in the remotest parts of the country on Saturday morning. Communications and Advertisements must be transmitted accordingly. None can appear that do not reach the office by Thursday afternoon's post.

The Forty-fifth Volume of the LAW TIMES, now complete, may be uniformly and strongly bound at the LAW TIMES Office for 58. 6d.

THE

Law and the Lawyers

THE Lord Chief Justice BOVILL has kindly consented to take the chair at the forthcoming annual festival of the United Law Clerks' Society,

which will take place at the Freemason's Tavern on Monday, May 3rd, in accordance with a wish expressed by his Lordship.

MR. VERNON HARCOURT, Q.C., Mr. FITZJAMES STEPHEN, Q.C., and Mr. E. C. CLARKE, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, are candidates for the Professorship of International Law recently founded at Cambridge through the munificence of the late Dr. WHEWELL, Master of Trinity College.

THE Solicitor-General (Sir J. D. COLERIDGE) has given notice of his intention to move for leave to bring in a Bill for the Abolition of Religious Tests in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge.

MR. NORWOOD has obtained leave to bring in a Bill to extend and regulate the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the County Courts.

MR. BUCCLEUGH, registrar of meetings, and Mr. STACEY, the registrar's clerk, have been appointed 303 by the LORD CHANCELLOR to take affidavits under sect. 11 of the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1868. This duty has heretofore been per

TO CORRESPONDENTS

LEADING ARTICLES:

Topics of the Week

Repression of Crime

Bankruptcy Law Reform.

Bankruptcy.

Mr. Purcell, Q.C.

County Court Costs

Our Law Libraries

302

Sir William Erle on the Law of Trades-Unions

Power of Colonial Legislatures

303

Judicial Statistics for the Year 1867

ELECTION LAW:

What is Agency?

Withdrawn Petitions

The Costs of a Petition.

305

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THE Queen's Speech recommends a select committee to inquire whether some better means might not be devised for securing the freedom and purity of elections, both Parliamentary and 308 municipal. The inquiry will be of no small value, even if it should do nothing more than make known to the people of this country, upon authority they will believe, how the freedom and purity of elections are secured in America

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300 and in our Colonies.

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310 AMONG the notices of motion on Tuesday was one by Mr. MAGUIRE for an inquiry into the landed property in Ireland held by the London corporations. This is the first open attack upon property in the new Parliament. What amount

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of favour will it find?

MR. LOCKE KING has given notice of a motion for the 9th March, to assimilate the law of real estate to that of personal estate. The terms are 314 somewhat vague. He cannot intend to assimi315 late the entire law, of course, and he does not indicate which portion of it he proposes so to deal with. We shall examine his scheme with 316 much curiosity.

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The Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Gateshead Articled Clerks' Society

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Law Students' Debating Society.

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REPRESSION OF CRIME.

THE HOME SECRETARY has announced his intention to introduce on Monday a Bill for the better

318 repression of crime by the more effective supervision of criminals. We refrain from anticipating his plan; but the subject is attended with more practical difficulties than appear

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upon the surface, and the more it is considered, the more do these difficulties grow in number and magnitude. This was made very apparent on Monday at a discussion upon the question by the Law Amendment Society, in which Mr. HASTINGS, Col. FRASER, Mr. ELLIOTT, Mr. Serjt. Cox, M.P., Mr. F. HILL, and Sir E. WILMOT took part, and which brought out considerable diversity of opinion, not upon the principle, for that was unanimously conceded, but upon the manner of enforcing it. It was the knowledge of these difficulties and the conviction that the public mind is not yet prepared to deal with the matter so vigorously as the necessity of the case requires, that induced Mr. Serjt. Cox to give notice of a motion for a select committee of inquiry previously to attempted legislation. The Government, however, has thought that they might at once venture upon a definite measure, and Mr. Serjt. Cox will, therefore, probably defer his intended motion until Mr. AUSTIN BRUCE shall have produced his promised bill, and then, if need be, he will propose that it be sent to a select committee to make the inquiries which his motion had designed to precede, instead of following, legislation.

BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORM.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL has lost no time in the preparation of his promised Bankruptcy Bill. On Tuesday he gave notice that he would introduce it on the 26th inst. We believe that it is substantially the same as the Bill of Sir JomN KARSLAKE, which last session died in its infancy, like so many of its predecessors. A fragment was taken from it and made law through the exertions of Mr. MOFFAT in one house, and Lord CAIRNS in the other, and the complete success that has attended that experiment augurs well for the remainder of the scheme whence it was extracted. The Bill will be bulky, for it codifies the entire law and practice of bankruptcy. It is to be desired that the Commons should not do more than deal with the outlines of the plan. These being debated and determined, the details must be entrusted to the Government. If the House is to go into committee and talk over each of the 500 clauses, and every member, commercial and legal, who thinks he knows something about it will propose amendments, and press his own crotchets, the Act will be as faulty as its predecessors, and no session will be long enough to convert it into a law. We trust that Sir ROBERT COLLIER will be enabled to signalise his tenure of office by the completion of a reform which has been long urgently demanded, promised year after year, attempted session after session, and never performed. We believe that in the work he has undertaken he will have the cordial assistance of the lawyers on both sides of the House.

BANKRUPTCY.

MR. MOFFATT's Act of last session has been a great success. A recent return of its results for the first three months of its operation shows a decrease in the number of private arrangement deeds from 2010 to 804, and a reduction of the unsecured debts from 5,309,0481 to 1,267,4717. The officials are of opinion that, since the Act came into operation, not a single fraudulent deed has passed. But what a revelation is this of the iniquities practised under the previous law! It may be fairly presumed that the difference of numbers represents the amount of fraud that existed formerly. This is manifest from the fact, that while deeds of arrangement have decreased by 70 per cent., the number of bankruptcies has increased from 2245 to 2361, and the diminution has been almost wholly in the class of deeds where the compositions would not exceed 5s. in the pound. This will be at once an example and encouragement to the bankruptcy law reform which the Government has promised.

MR. PURCELL, Q. C.

AN incident of the Dublin Election Petition has caused a good deal of excitement in the legal circle of that city. Mr. Justice KEOGH, in his judgment, mildly alluded to the appearance of the name of a distinguished barrister as prominent among the parties concerned. The allusion was manifestly to Mr. PURCELL, Q. Chat thereupon wrote to the Judge, asking all imhis allusions referred, and repudi Judge took proper doings. Of this lettend answered the public notice upon the b

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if founded on tort, whether by verdict, judgment by default, or on demurrer, or otherwise, he shall not be entitled to any costs of suit unless the Judge certify on the record that there was sufficient reason for bringing such action in such Superior Court, or unless the court or a Judge at chambers shall by rule or order allow such costs."

If the matter rested there, I think I have effec-tort which cannot be brought in a County Court tually disposed of the statement in the letter, and shown there was not a word, not even a single line of evidence, or a document laid before the court, but that there was evidence of the most glaring character to bring Mr. Purcell into close connection not only with the election, but with the persons who, through their agents, did the acts which have contributed to render invalid and void

the election of Sir Arthur Guinness. There was the taking up of the man who resolved, having been badly treated by the other side, to vote and do all he could for the gentleman the society was in favour of, and in doing so was guilty of corrupt practices, which have rendered the election void.

was imparted on this same testimony a knowledge of the fact that Mr. Purcell was himself

a member of the Conservative Registration Society.

Now the Conservative Registration Society for the city of Dublin is formed, legitimately, I will say, for the purpose of sustaining the claims of Conservative voters, and also for the purpose, legitimately also, of raising every possible objection to the claims of the Liberal voters, and it is conducted by Mr. Fox Goodman, the gentleman to whom Mr. Purcell issued the introduction. But let me say, also, that the duty of a revising barrister is to weigh and to determine fairly between

both parties. Every objection raised upon one side and on the other he has to determine as revising barrister. If a member of a registration society should be placed in the position of determining the question at issue, it is very like, if not exactly, deciding in his own case. In all these things we are in the habit of referring to authority, and if we can have it, to judicial authority. It will be in the recollection of the gentlemen

of the Bar whom I see before me that the learned Chief Justice of England, than whom a more worthy conservator of the constitutional privileges of the people, as well as the rights of the Sovereign, never sat on the English Bench, felt it to be his duty to remove from the office of revising barrister Mr. Edmond Beales, not because it was suspected that he would deal in anyway wrongly, but because he was actively identified with the current politics of the day. The Lord Chief Justice said that he had every satisfaction that

the gentleman would discharge his duty efficiently;

still that it could not be thought he was a fit person to place in the position. And if the Lord Chief Justice, on those general grounds, felt it to be his duty to take that strong course, I think I took a very mild course when I confined my observation to the passing remark that among the names of those who took a warm interest in the election, I noticed the name of one gentleman who had presided at the late Parliamentary revision. Far be it from me to think of comment

ing in the slightest way upon the justice of the executive Government, more especially in the exercise of their patronage; but I think I am justified in saying this-that if in future revising barristers are selected from the lists of such societies, formed upon one side or the other, for the purpose of deciding the justice or injustice of claims to be placed on the registry, the citizens will find it very difficult to think that the occasion falls in any way short of the description once given by a great Judge, now no more, to another proceeding: "That the registration under such circumstances would become a mockery, a delusion, and a snare." This much has been elicited from me by the letter I have referred to. I hope I have shown that I was not without warrant when

I pronounced the words, which I used more as a warning for the future than as a criticism upon the past. I do not regret now that in consequence of the letter I have had an opportunity of more fully expressing my opinion upon transactions of which I hope we shall never again see the recurrence.

COUNTY COURT COSTS.

A MOST important decision on the interpretation of the 5th section of the County Courts Act 1867, has been given by the Court of Queen's Bench in the case (not yet reported) of Gray v. West. That section provides that "if in any (i.e., ion commenced after the passing of this Act Superion Aug. 1867) in any of Her Majesty's recover a swarts of Record the plaintiff shall the action is fout exceeding twenty pounds if on contract, or ten pounds

Now, it so happens, whether it be intentional on the part of the Legislature or the result of an oversight, that notwithstanding the County Courts Act of 1867, there are certain actions of but must still be commenced in one of the Superior Courts, viz., actions for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, or seduction, which were excluded from the cognisance of the County Courts by the 58th section of the original Act: (9 & 10 Vict. c. 95.) These actions, though they must be commenced in a Superior Court, may, however, be sent down for trial to a County Court, under the circumstances mentioned in sect. 10 of the County Courts Act 1867. In Gray v. West, the action was one of slander, and was commenced in a Superior Court in Oct. 1867, and so after the passing of the County Courts Act of that year. It was tried in Trinity Term 1868, and a verdict returned for the plaintiff for 101., the Judge (HANNEN, J.) to give a certificate that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in a Superior Court. On a summons being taken out by the plaintiff at chambers the matter was referred for decision to the full court, who granted a rule nisi, calling on the defendant to show cause why the plaintiff should not be allowed his costs. The rule has since been argued, and the court, in a considered judgment, have made it absolute, thinking it "obviously quite beside the general object of a County Court Act to subject plaintiffs to the loss of costs for suing in the Superior Courts for causes of action which could not be sued for elsewhere."

refusing

A first reading of the section would lead one to suppose that the refusal of the Judge at the trial to certify on the record that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in a Superior Court would have the same effect in depriving a plaintiff of his costs, as the refusal of "the court or a Judge at chambers" to make a rule or order for the allowance of them. The Court of Queen's Bench, however, in their judgment, distinguish between the two. "The jurisdiction given to the Judge at the trial and that given to the court or a Judge at chambers are separate and distinct. The Judge at the trial is empowered to certify on a single point, namely, whether there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the Superior Court. The power given to the court or a Judge at chambers is generally to allow the plaintiff his costs. The words relating to the certificate of the Judge at the trial are taken from those of the enactment previously in force on this point, which was contained in the 12th section of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, and it is clear that they were there intended to apply to those cases only in which the County Court had jurisdiction, but in which, nevertheless, it was reasonable that the plaintiff should sue in the Superior Court. This is in effect the natural import of such a form of certificate, which is appropriate to express an option and reasonable election of the plaintiff to sue in the Superior Court as contrasted with the County Court, but appears quite inappropriate to refer to a case in which the plaintiff had no option but was compelled to sue in the Superior Court, or not to sue at all. It appears to us that the certificate was intended to have the same meaning and application in the section now before us as a similar certificate had under the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 12, and if this be so, it seems to give rise to much doubt whether the 5th section of the late Act was really intended to have any application to cases in which the County Court had no jurisdiction. If, however, it was intended to apply to such cases, the general authority given to the court or a Judge to allow the plaintiff his costs, would at all events enable them to do so in cases of this nature, where it appeared proper to make such allowance. In making such allowance we should not be reviewing or interfering with the discretion exercised by the Judge at the trial, who merely declined to give in this case a certificate which was not properly applicable to it, but was only applicable to cases in which the County Court had jurisdiction. And as it is plain that the Legislature intended that plaintiffs who had

the power of suing in the Superior Courts were to be allowed their costs, it seems impossible to suppose that it was intended that such allowance should not be made to plaintiffs who had no such election, and whose only remedy was in the Superior Court."

If, then, the plaintiff, in an action of tort which cannot be commenced in a County Court, recovers damages to an amount which would entitle him to costs under the general rule applicable to such an action of tort in the Superior Courts, he may have his costs, although he recover a sum not exceeding 10l., and although the Judge at the trial refuse to certify.

OUR LAW LIBRARIES.

NOTWITHSTANDING all that has been written of late on the urgent need of reforms in the management of their affairs by the various Inns of Court, those learned bodies manifest no signs of being conscious of the possibility or the need of any improvement, and show no desire to satisfy the most obvious wants of the working members of the Profession. The non-professional public are disposed to set this down to the inveterate

conservatism of all legal bodies; their dislike of all changes, however beneficial; their repugnance to any inroads or abuses which are time honoured, or anomalies which can plead prescription in their favour. In this view of the case we think injustice is done to the Benchers of the several Inns of Court, of whom a large number are men of liberal tendencies and enlightened views, and are by no means hostile to beneficial innovations. The real secret of the matter is this. The leading men amongst the Benchers are lawyers

in large practice, who have little time for any. thing beyond the strict duties of their profession. Their attention is wholly engrossed by matters

other than those connected with the management of the Inns to which they belong, and in consequence the government of those institutions is practically left in the hands of a few men, who, from one cause or another, are insensible to the need of reforms, or wanting in the energy requisite for carrying them out. It is a pity that this should be so, as, with the means at the disposal of the several Inns, a far greater degree of accommodation might be afforded to their members, and a much larger amount of good done than the present system of management produces.

It is not, however, the object of this article to enter on the large field of legal reform in general; it is proposed to advert only to the subject of the law libraries. It is needless to dwell on the importance of a library to the legal practitioner; in no other profession is it so essential; the lawyer is, in fact, never independent of his library. Though a barrister have in his private collection all the reports and the leading text writers, he will still find it sometimes necessary to have recourse to a more complete collection of legal works than any barrister can bring together in his own chambers. And there are not many lawyers who possess all the reports and the leading text writers. A junior member of the Profession can hardly be expected to be in possession of so costly a supply; yet to him it is especially necessary that he should have ready access to the depositories of that complex learning with which practice has not yet familiarised him. Now the library attached to his inn contains all that he wants in this respectall the statutes, reports, text-books, and other books which he requires to consult, arranged in orderly manner and catalogued, and also librarians able and courteous, to aid him, if necessary, in his search. The library of his inn contains within its walls all that the practitioner wants; the only drawback is, that it is closed just when he requires, and when only he has leisure to consult it. A practising barrister is not free from his occupation in court until after four p.m.; he then returns to his chambers, finds business awaiting him possibly for the next day, which involves points of law which he would like to look up thoroughly in the books of authority; but the libraries (with the exception of that of the Inner Temple, which has for a short time back been kept open till six p.m.), close at four p.m. precisely, and do not open till the next morning.

For a large portion of the working members of the Profession, the libraries are thus rendered wholly valueless. To the Bencher it matters little when the library is closed, as he is entitled, according to existing arrangements, to send for whatever books he wants and have them brought to his chambers-a right the exercise of which

often produces this effect: that when a barrister ❘ goes to the library to look for a particular work, he finds that it has been sent to the chambers of one of the masters of the inn, and the porter knows not when it may be returned. Surely when Benchers are allowed to take away books from the library, the library should contain duplicate copies of those most in requisition.

The difficulties in the way of keeping the libraries open later than they are, are purely imaginary. The objection founded on the possible danger of gas is sufficiently answered by the satisfactory working of the library of the Incorporated Law Society, and those of many other institutions throughout the country. The expense of an additional porter to relieve, if necessary, in the evenings those who during the

day do the not very heavy work of occasionally pointing out the whereabouts of a book, would be

triffing. Of one thing there can be no doubt, the keeping of the libraries open later would be a great boon to very many of those who practise the legal Profession; and we are disposed to think that the junior members of the Inns of Court, who are those chiefly interested in the matter, have a right to expect that their reasonable wishes on the subject should meet with a favourable consideration from the senior members who have the conduct of affairs in their hands.

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We continue our analysis of this essay on a subject of the first importance by a first authority. It is, however, necessary to remark that it is written in a singularly confused style, unlike the author's wonted clearness and vigour upon the Bench.

Having proved the general proposition, that the common law prohibits obstruction of the freedom of trade and of labour, the next question that presents itself is, What is such an obstruction as the law will prohibit and punish?

This, says Sir WILLIAM ERLE, "will depend, under some circumstances, on the purpose of the actor." Intent is of the essence of an offence in the nature of a crime, but inasmuch as it is impossible to prove what is passing in an offender's mind, the law, equally with reason, presumes the intent with which an act is done to be that which would be its probable consequence, and it throws upon the accused the burden of proving that he had no such intent. We doubt, therefore, the strict accuracy of the statement that the lawfulness or otherwise of a trade obstruction depends upon the intent with which it is done. A lawful obstruction would not become unlawful by the intent of the actor, nor would an unlawful obstruction be rendered lawful by the absence of intent. These circumstances alter the position and responsibility of the actor, but do not change the right or wrong of the act. Sir W. ERLE refers to R. v. Rowland, 5 Cox C. C., 436, to illustrate his meaning. There the offence was the giving of refreshment, money, and advice to workmen, when going to the factory of Messrs. PERRY, to induce them to

depart from their work. In itself the gift of

refreshment was innocent, and might even be beneficent, and therefore lawful; but the design, which was to obstruct the free use of labour,

rendered the act illegal. The offence in the case was the obstruction, and not the refreshment. The latter was only the instrument by which the offence was committed, as a stick might be struck in play or in passion, and if death ensued the act would be the same, but the consequence would be mischance or murder, according to the intent.

From these principles it is assumed "that a person has a right to do as he chooses with his own, whether labour or capital, within the limits set by law; that a right involves a prohibition against the infringement thereof, and that a prohibition involves a remedy for the violation thereof."

Sir WILLIAM ERLE puts it, however, very properly that the question, What constitutes an obstruction? is one of degree, incapable of strict definition, although to some extent governed by certain general rules. "In the first place," he says, "it is a general rule, relating to all nuisances, whether by obstruction or otherwise, that unlawfulness begins at a certain degree of annoyance, and that this degree is to be measured, not by an exact standard, but on a supposed estimate of what is reasonable by men assumed

to be prudent." Secondly, "The lawful exercise of a right is not a wrong. Where there are conflicting interests, the limits for the exercise of the rights relating to such interests vary as circumstances vary, and the adjustment of the line where lawfulness ends and excess begins is not easy, because it is perpetually shifting. Each competitor in trade may hinder another, but the hindrance may not amount to unlawful obstruction." Thirdly, "The rights in respect of demand and supply of labour are in

a sense reciprocal, that is, obstruction of supply must be an obstruction in the way of the demand which would have been supplied but for the obstruction and was not." Fourthly, "The means of obstruction may be acts unlawful in themselves, but the intrinsic unlawfulness is

irrelevant to their unlawfulness from obstructing the free course of trade." Fifthly, "The ob

struction may be caused by the use of words operating to alienate workmen and employers from each other. The use of such words for the purpose of obstructing trade may be either lawful or unlawful, upon the principles in accordance with which defamation injurious to character may be justifiable or not."

These five principles, or, as we would rather term them, limitations in the application of the general principle that obstruction of the free course of trade and labour is unlawful, do not certainly appear to us to do much towards solving the problem, what is such an obstruction as the law will punish.

Sir W. ERLE then notices some of the objections that have been made to the principles he has affirmed, such as that of competition, which is said to be inconsistent with them, and yet is recognised by the law. "But," he says, "the competition to which the law for securing a free course for trade relates is the competition between workmen themselves, where the supply of labour exceeds the demand, and between employers where the demand for labour of a given kind in a given locality exceeds the supply." He denies that competition exists between the capitalist and the labourer; and he is right; competition means an emulation between two or more possessors of the same or a similar subject of demand to have the supply by holding out some inducement for a preference by the purchasers. Capital may compete with capital to buy labour, and labour may compete with labour for employment by capital; but there can be no competition between capital and labour.

Bearing this in mind, it will be seen more clearly what is the nature of those attempts to restrain trade and labour that have been the subject both of legislation and of judicial interpretation. They are for the most part the result of "combinations by which individuals of one class, whether employers or labourers, have attempted to restrain others of the same class from direct competition with themselves."

Sir W. ERLE says, "Up to a certain point the attempt may be lawful." But then again the become unlawful? question comes, At what point does the attempt The answer of the learned Judges is, that the attempt to restrain others of the same class from competition with themselves begins to be unlawful, "when unlawful coercion is attempted to be put upon the will of any individual in disposing of his labour and his capital."

Certainly the argument has not advanced very far as yet; it amounts to this, that combination in restraint of trade is unlawful, when unlawful means are adopted for the attainment of the object-a proposition which no lawyer would dispute. But, as we have read the argument here, it is that the common law prohibits the obstruction of trade or labour per se as a wrong to the community; that the act of obstruction is punishable when there was an intent to obstruct. If so, it is surely a combination to obstruct would be unlawful, although obstruction was to be done by lawful means, and so not limited, as above expressed, to unlawful coercion to effect the unlawful object.

We cannot attempt to reconcile this seeming discrepancy, nor is it of much practical importance, for, as the law now stands, the prohibition in fact extends only to cases of combination where "unlawful coercion is attempted to be put upon the will of any individual in disposing of his labour and his capital."

And now come the difficult and disputable questions, first, what is "unlawful coercion," and secondly, what it ought to be? What is

the law, is it sufficient, and how should it be amended?

These questions we must reserve for consideration in another article.

POWER OF COLONIAL LEGISLATURES. THE case of Phillips v. Eyre, which we publish in this week's number of our reports has brought before the court of Queen's Bench for decision the most important question relating to the law

making power of colonial legislative assemblies, which has for a very long time arisen; and the question has been determined in a manner which concedes to the legislatures of our colonies, the utmost amplitude of jurisdiction.

The facts which furnished the grounds for the

proceedings, both criminal and civil, against Mr. Eyre, the late governor of Jamaica, are so well known, that it is unnecessary to refer to them. To indemnify him and the officers whe acted under him against all liability for the acts committed by them in suppressing the negro rebellion of 1865, an Act of the Jamaica Legislative Assembly, to the validity of which Governor Eyre's own assent was necessary, was passed, declaring that "all proceedings, civil or criminal, present or future," instituted against them should be "discharged and made void," and that they should be "freed and indemnified both against the Crown and against all other persons." The Act further declared all things done bona fide for the suppression of the rebellion " to be lawful," and confirmed them, and made a certificate under the hand of the Governor for the time being, conclusive evidence that any particular acts were bona fide done for that purpose. The competency of a colonial legislature to make such a law which would be binding on the judicial tribunals at home, was the great point involved in the case of Phillips v. Eyre.

The retrospective operation of a law of this kind in divesting persons wronged of the rights of action which, on the commission of the wrongs, had vested in them, was the ground chiefly relied on in the argument on behalf of the plaintiff against the binding force of the Act of Indemnity. Directly a tortious act had been committed, it was urged, a right of action, alternative in its character, vested in the injured person; namely, a right to sue for damages in the courts of the colony, or to bring an action in the home court. Can the colonial legislature, it was asked, subsequently intervene and pass a law which will deprive the injured person of the right which had already vested in him?

Of one part of his alternative right it was not disputed that an act of the colonial legislature could divest the plaintiff, that is, his right to bring an action in any of the courts of the colony itself. Any legislature can make a law, even ex post facto, binding within the extent of its own jurisdiction, making that lawful which before was unlawful, and no action can be maintained in any court bound by the enactments of such a legislature in respect of a deed thus legalised ex post facto. But it was denied

that the courts of other countries were bound by a law so made. For a wrong committed on a British subject in a colony he has an immediate right to sue at home; and, it was contended, no enactment of the colonial legislature subsequently passed can divest him of the right which has once vested in him.

The Court of Queen's Bench did not adopt this reasoning. It has decided that an Act of a colonial legislature-and the reasoning applies to the Acts of all foreign legislatures-may have the effect of divesting of a right of action at home which has vested in respect of a wrong committed abroad. "The rule which obtains in respect of property and civil contracts," said Chief Justice Cockburn, in delivering the judgment of the court, "namely, that an Act, unless intended to take effect elsewhere, shall, as regards its effect and incidents, if a conflict of law arises between the lex loci and the lex fori, be governed by the former, appears to me to be applicable to the case of an Act occasioning personal injury. To hold the contrary would be attended with the most inconvenient and startling consequences, and would be altogether contrary to that comity of nations in matters of law to which effect should, if possible, be given." "Local legislatures having been established in our colonies, with plenary powers of legislation, the same comity which obtains between nations should be extended to them by the tribunals of this country when their law conflicts with ours

in respect of acts done within the ambit of their jurisdiction." It would clearly have been competent, the court thought, to the colonial legislature, in anticipation of future events, to have passed a statute legalising acts, otherwise wrongful, which it might be necessary to do in

number of attendable petitions a decrease of 50, as compared with the number for the preceding year, but exceeds by 97 the average of the seven years. The following are the numbers of attendable petitions under the different descriptions of proceeding in 1866-67.

In causes

Under Acts relating to railways and other public

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works

the Trustee Acts of 1850 and 1852.

the Trustee Relief Acts 1847 and 1849.

the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act... the Acts relating to charities.

the Winding-up and Joint stock Companies Acts

the Infants Settlement Act 1855

face of those events; and indeed it was not contended on the part of the plaintiff that in such a case an action could be maintained, either at home or in the colony, in respect of an act whose character had thus been changed before it was performed. But after an act has once been committed which by the existing colonial law is wrongful, the right to sue, either at home Inother general matters or in the colony, for the injury sustained has accrued to the person wronged. If the colonial legislature then interpose, and declare that the wrongful act done shall be deemed lawful, and indemnify against all legal proceedings in respect of it, such an ex post facto legislative enactment takes away, doubtless, all cause of action in the colony; but does it also take away the right to sue in the courts at home? "We are

of opinion," say the Court of Queen's Bench, "that the same principle which we have stated to be applicable to an act made lawful by prior legislation is equally applicable to an act originally wrongful, but legalised by an ex post facto law." Ex post facto colonial legislation may then take away a cause of action which has once vested.

636

531

250 257

66

6

170

6

113

2035

Of the foregoing petitions, as stated in the return, 1522 were on the higher scale of court fees, and 494 on the lower scale; 19 fixed, or exempt from fees.

There were, further, 10 petitions presented to the Lord Chancellor in 1866-8 for orders of course, against 20 in the preceding year, and 13 the average of the seven years. There were 5 letters

inclusive, are shown in the return furnished by the chief clerk to the Masters in Lunacy, in the same form as for preceding years. The numbers of the proceedings under each head, with the amounts of cash, &c. as shown in the return for 1866-7, is

as follows, with the number and amounts for the preceding year, and with the average for the years 1860-65.

Orders of inquiry in commissions of lunacy, exe-
cuted by Masters in Lunacy.

Reports made to the Lord Chancellor.
Bonds and recognisances taken as security for
lunatics' estates

Certificates as to such securities

Certificates for investment of cash already in court belonging to lunatics

Certificates for payment of money, transfer of stock into court, investment of cash in court,

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missive in 1866-7, against 9 in the preceding year, Summond other deedledd approsters

and 7, the average of the seven years. There were
7 warrants, against 6 in 1865-6, and 4, the average
of the seven years.

Of the petitions presented, 20 were for hearing
before the Lord Chancellor, 147 before the Lords
Justices, 612 before Vice-Chancellors Kindersley
and Malins, 659 before Vice-Chancellor Stuart,
and 597 before Vice-Chancellor Wood, The amount

Amount of receipts in the accounts and affidavits of committees and receivers in lunacy passed during the year...

1539

189

313

129 4.539

£523,816

Amount of disbursements and allowances therein £439046 Registrar in Lunacy. In the return furnished by the Registrar in Lunacy for the year ending Nov. 1, 1867, the proceedings in his office are shown under the same heads, as in the returns for the

At first sight this may seem a startling pro- of fees collected in the office by means of stamps preceding years.

position; but there is no cause for alarm; no ground for fearing that the interests of British subjects may be abandoned to the caprice or malignity of colonial legislatures. The assent of the Sovereign is essential to the validity of every act of a colonial legislature, and this assent is given under the advice of a minister who is responsible for his conduct to the Imperial Parliament. With such a safeguard, the exercise of the plenary power accorded to the legislative assemblies of the colonies is not likely to lead to any measures which our courts should hesitate to be bound by.

Indeed, a different decision would be a practical denial to our colonies of that complete power of self government which in theory we have conferred upon them. If their power of self government is complete, their legislatures must be held competent to determine the lawfulness or unlawfulness of every act done within their jurisdiction; they must not be denied the right which the Imperial Parliament has so often exercised, of passing Acts of indemnity after deeds have been done which, according to the existing state of the law could not be justified, but which circumstances of great political emergency were considered to excuse, if not

render commendable.

In the case of Phillips v. Eyre, a further objection was urged to the Act of Indemnity, namely, that the assent of Mr. Eyre as governor was necessary to the passing of the Act, and that he could not by any act of his own, or any act to which he was a necessary party, indemnify himself against the consequences of his tortious deeds. This objection, however, was very summarily dealt with by the court. "There is no ground whatever," says the judgment, "for saying that the governor of a colony cannot give his official consent to a legislative measure by which he may be individually interested. It might as well be asserted that the Sovereign of these realms could not give assent to a Bill in Parliament in which the Sovereign was personally interested."

JUDICIAL STATISTICS FOR THE
YEAR 1867.

(Continued from page 265.)

COURT OF CHANCERY (Continued.)

Examiners' return. The proceedings in the office of the Examiners of the High Court of Chancery for the year ended the 2nd of November 1867 are shown in the return furnished by the sworn clerks. The number of witnesses examined was 431, exceeding the number for the preceding year by 34. It exceeds by 54 the average of the numbers for the seven years 1859-65. The amount of fees received by stamps in the Office of the Examiners was 270l., exceeding by 211. the amount for the preceding year, and by 441. the average for

the seven years.

was 16511., against 1725l. in the preceding year, and 1529l., the average of the seven years.

Principal Secretary at the Rolls. The return furnished by the Secretary of Decrees and Causes at the Rolls shows the proceedings in the office of the Secretary at the Rolls also for the year commencing Nov. 2, 1866, and ending Nov. 1867. In the number of petitions set down for hearing there is a decrease of 239, as compared with the number for the year 1865-6, and of 50, as compared with the average of the seven years, 1859-65.

The following table shows the number of petitions set down for hearing at the Rolls, under the different matters to which they relate.

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There were besides, in 1866-7, 4139 petitions presented for orders of course, and orders of course drawn up, against 3624 in the preceding year, and 3503, the average of seven years. Of the 4139 petitions presented for orders of course in 1866-7, 3944 were on the higher scale of fees, and 195 on the lower scale. Of the petitions set down for hearing, 648 were at 11. and 105 at 5s.

Taxing Masters' Returns. The return furnished by the taxing masters of the High Court of Chancery shows the number of orders and references for taxation brought into the respective offices, the number of bills taxed, and the number of certificates and allocaturs made by each taxing master. They show also the amount of fees and the amount of costs taxed, distinguishing the amounts on the lower and on the higher scales.

The following are the totals of bills taxed under the different headings in the offices of the 1867:seven taxing masters in the year ending at Nov.

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The total proceedings show an increase of 213 or 6'1 per cent., in the number of orders and references for taxation; of 445, or 6.5 per cent., in the number of bills taxed; and of 173, or 57 per cent.,

in the number of certificates and allocaturs made above the number for 1865-6. In comparison with the average of the numbers for the years 1859-65, there is an increase of 331, or 9.8 per cent., under the first head, of 238, or 3.3 per cent., under the second head, and of 239, or 8.2 per cent., under the

last head. The amount of costs taxed was 815,450l. 5s. 4d., of which 46,2161. Os. 3d. was on the lower scale, 769,2341. 5s. 1d. on the higher scale. In the preceding year the total amount was 788,7891. 10s. 11d., of which 46,484. 148. was on the lower scale,

742,3047. 168. 11d. on the higher scale; the total

Principal Secretary to the Lord Chancellor.- amount for 1866-7 being higher than the average The return furnished by the Lord Chancellor's by 61,300l. 19s. 7d., or upwards of 8 per cent. Principal Secretary of the proceedings in his office Masters in Lunacy. - The statistics of the duties for the year commencing with the 2nd November performed in the office of the Masters in Lunacy 1866, and ending with Nov. 1, 1867, shows in the during the year from Nov. 2, 1866, to Nov. 1, 1867,

court..

Amount of stock directed to be sold or transferred out of court

225,570

239,901

Amount of stock directed by orders in lunacy to be transferred otherwise than into court... 148,568 Accountant General's Return. - The return furnished by the Accountant General of the pro ceedings in his office for the year ended the 1st of Oct. 1867, shows the amount of cash, securities. and other effects paid and transferred into court and out of court, and other proceedings in the office during the year.

The total amounts were

Cash and Securities

Paid into court..
Paid out of court.

8. d £. .17,048,862 16 5 16,542,127 5 8

The number of cheques signed was 47,354. The number of powers of attorney issued was 3803. The total number of accounts was 27,673. For the preceding year these numbers were respectively 46,920, 3,711, and 27,231. The averages for the years 1859-65 are 44,057, 3,246, and 24,236.

ELECTION LAW.

WHAT IS AGENCY?

MR. JUSTICE BLACKBURN has frankly avowed that no two of the Judges can agree upon a definition of agency, and that they could derive little or no assistance from the decisions of Parliamentary committees. This is not to be wondered at, for the decisions of committees were notoriously governed by no definite principles. If the majority desired to unseat the member, anything sufficed for proof of agency; if they desired to save him, nothing sufficed to constitute agency. When the new tribunal was created it was hoped and believed that the judges would throw aside the worthless law made by the committees, and construct a new law in accordance with that which they recognise in their own courts, and which is sanctioned by reason and justice. Unfortunately they did not so; but, departing entirely from the common law, endeavoured to resuscitate the old com mittee law. The consequences are as might have been anticipated. Having cut themselves from the safe mooring of a law well defined, well understood, easy of application, and admitting of no dispute, they find themselves tossed upon a sea of trouble, without rudder to guide, or oar to help them. Having no established principles of agency before them, as in their own

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