a new league in 1805, operate with manifold force after the fatal changes which have ushered in the present year, and have flowed from the errors of the last. We are thus prepared for the remaining part of the discussion-the present state of continental affairs, and the new, and necessarily moderate and pacific system which it prescribes to this country. Having, therefore, fully fully explained to what causes England and Europe owe the misfortunes which have lately happened, we now proceed to take a view of the extent of those misfortunes. II. CONSEQUENCES OF OUR LATE 1. The actual changes of dominion which the third Coalition has already produced, are in the highest degree alarm ing whether we consider them as losses to Austria or gains to France. At the last peace, the Venetian territory had even been imagined by some to be a fair compensation for the loss of the Netherlands. In several points of view, its importance was certainly of the very first rank. Besides a large extent of the most fruitful country, a population of nearly two millions, and a revenue of a million sterling; it gave Austria a line of sea coast, studded with excellent harbours, in the immediate neighbourhood of those rich provinces, which had long been checked in their progress, by their scanty means of foreign commerce. The acquisition of Venice easily rendered the power which also possessed the extensive dominions on the north of the Adriatic, mistress of that sea. The country to the East of the Gulf, was valuable in case any views might hereafter be formed respecting Turkey;-or might become necessary from the policy of other states in relation to that defence, less neighbour. The footing which the Venetian territory gave Austria in Lombardy, added to her dominions in the Alpine Country, served to retain somewhat at least of her former sway in the affairs of Italy; gave her a certain security against any further changes being attempted by France in that quarter; and secured, when an opportunity might offer, the means of regaining the ascendant she had once possessed in those fine countries. All these valuable possessions are now lost; and all the prospects of which they were the foundation-the hopes of external influence, and the more solid expectation of domestic improvement, are vanished for ever. France, or her dependency, the Italian Republic, has completed the conquest of Lombardy. From the Gulf of Genoa to the Gulph of Istria, all is French. To estimate how much France has gained by the acquisition of the Venetian provinces, it is only necessary that we should reflect on the importance of those territories to the Italian Republic, from their position, and the facilities which they af ford of increasing the naval power of the enemy. The commerce of Venice, now very considerable, and only checked since the revolution by the impolitic preference given to Trieste, will increase rapidly, when at least equal exertions are made to encourage it. At present it does not occupy less than 400 vessels belonging to the port of Venice alone. In its better days the number of these was tenfold. The naval arsenal of that city is famous, and the neighbouring harbours perfectly well adapted to the purposes of trade. The coast of Dalmatia, with the islands, possesses perhaps more fine ports, with strong fortifications, than any in the world. Nona, Zara, Sebenico, Trau, Spalatro, Castel Nuovo, Matero, Lesina, Corcyra-are but a few of the harbours impregnable to attack, and commanding every commercial advantage, which have now fallen into the hands of the Cisalpine and its masters. It is unnecessary to state how prodigious an accession of trade and force this must, in a short time, secure to France; and how paramount it must render her superiority in the Mediterranean. Whether we now attempt to defend Sicily, or avert the downfall of Turkey and the seizure of Egypt, we shall feel the consequences of the treaty of Presburg in every operation of the war. The loss of the Tyrol, and its annexation to the new kingdom of Bavaria, is, though not from the superior territorial value of that province, yet certainly from its relative situation, of still greater detriment to Austria than her sacrifices in Italy. The natural strength of the country, the loy alty and valour of its inhabitants, and the skill which their mode of life gave them in the warfare adapted to mountainous countries, made the Tyrol altogether invaluable as a barrier against the invasion of the hereditary states; had the house of Austria but learnt the right use of those resources. Unhappily, there prevailed a constant jealousy of the Tyrolese, and an inclination to check them in those pursuits which were their most favourite occupation, and which formed the habits, of all others most necessary for the successful defence of their country. Even in a war which threatened the throne of the monarchy, the same |