Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: The United States Constitution, the European Convention, and the Canadian Charter'Lesbian and gay rights are human rights!' Is this just a political slogan to be chanted outside legislatures? Or are there legal arguments to support the claim that the right to be free from sexual orientation discrimination is a human right? In particular, can national constitutions and international human rights treaties be interpreted as prohibiting discrimination against same-sex activity, gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals, and same-sex couples? Robert Wintemute attempts to answer these questions by examining three of the most commonly used arguments in favour of such an interpretation: sexual orientation is an 'immutable status', sexual orientation is a 'fundamental choice' or part of 'privacy', and sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination. To assess the merits of these arguments, he looks at their relative success and failure in cases argued under three of the world's most influential human rights instruments: the United States Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He also considers the potential impact of the United Nations Human Rights Committee's recent interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Toonen v. Australia. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Fundamental | 4 |
Sexual Orientation Discrimination and Constitutional | 15 |
Copyright | |
19 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
9th Cir age of consent Amendment anal intercourse law analogous ground apply argued Article 14 bisexual persons Canada Canadian Charter CHRR cited Code Commission consensus Constitution Council of Europe criminal criteria Ct App decisions direction of attraction discrim discrimination against same-sex discrimination based dissenting distinction Dudgeon Egan emotional-sexual conduct engage equal protection European Convention F 2d F Supp federal freedom fundamental choice argument fundamental right Hardwick heterosexual heterosexual persons homosexual Ibid interference interpretation Justice justified Law Journal Law Review lesbian or bisexual liberty majority male marriage married Modinos opposite-sex couples oral or anal orientation as direction partner political quasi-suspect rational basis rational basis review right of privacy same-sex couples same-sex emotional-sexual conduct same-sex marriage same-sex oral same-sex sexual activity Section sex discrimination argument sexual orientation discrimination sodomy Steffan Supreme Court suspect classification t]he tion Toonen unmarried opposite-sex women