Where the wife alleged the communication of venereal disease by the husband to her, in support of her charge of adultery, and the husband recriminated adultery, and showed that shortly after such his wife's adulterous intercourse, and before his contracting such disease, the alleged paramour was affected with venereal disease; and there being no evidence of circumstances leading up to adultery on the husband's part, the Court held that, though when there is no aspersion upon the chastity of the wife, the venereal disease may, and frequently does furnish conclusive proof of the adultery of the husband, yet where the wife has exposed herself to the risk of infection elsewhere, the burden of proof is shifted, and she must shew either that he contracted the disease elsewhere, or that she could not have contaminated him : King v. King, 5 No. Ca. 252.

A man being frequently alone with a lady in her bed-chamber is a very strong circumstance: Rix v. Rix, 3 Hagg. 75.

Adultery-The Defence.-In cases of adultery committed by the wife, the husband is entitled to a separation unless there are such objections to his conduct as deprive him of any claim to relief. There are however, the following objections, which effectually bar his claim :—

.1 Compensatio criminis, or recrimination.
2. Condonation (unless there be such subse-

quent renewal of criminal conduct as to raise a fresh ground of suit), see post. 3. Connivance. The active procurement or passive toleration of his own dishonour, Crewe v. Crewe, 3 Hagg. 129. See post. 4. Collusion. See post.

To plead adultery on the part of the husband in answer to a suit at his instance by reason of adultery is a good recriminatory plea, Astley v. Astley, 1 Hagg. 716.

In cases of adultery it is incumbent on the husband to make such strict legal proof of the fact charged as shall not involve himself and create a legal bar; for if by evidence which he brings to establish adultery, he at the same time involves and implicates himself, the wife has the full benefit of this evidence, nor can he avail himself of a case in which he does not appear with clear hands, per Lord Stowell: Timmings v. Timmings, 3 Hagg. 77. He must purge his own conduct of all reasonable imputation of the same nature: Forster v. Forster, 1 Hagg. c. 153.

In a suit for separation á mensá et thoro by reason of the wife's adultery, she having, in a plea of recrimination, proved a long series of misconduct against the husband, for which she separated from him long prior to the adultery committed by her, is entitled to her dismissal; nor will a return to live in the same house, after a former separation on account of the husband's

adultery, operate as a condonation so as to extinguish her right to set up his guilt as a bar to his prayer, Beeby v. Beeby, 2 Hagg. 789.

In the Ecclesiastical Court it was a great question whether it could be pleaded that the Jewish religious regulations allow concubines, D'Aguilar v. D'Aguilar, 1 Hagg. 785: but this was because that was a Court Christian to which the parties had resorted: the Court of Divorce will probably consider themselves bound by this view by sect. 22 of the Act 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85. But even if the court should admit such defence it must be pleaded specially, 1 Hagg. 785.

A single act of adultery on the part of the plaintiff will, if fully proved, operate as a bar, Astley v. Astley, 1 Hagg. 722; though if a wife had left her husband and lived many years in a course of adultery, it may be doubted whether, if the husband in one frail moment should be faulty, it would be a compensatio criminis, Naylor v. Naylor, Cons. Trin. 1777, cited 1 Hagg. 721.

The mere solicition of chastity on the part of the husband has never been considered a bar, there being proof of adultery on the part of the wife, Chettle v. Chettle, 3 Phill. 508.

Where there was gross neglect on the part of the husband, and the solicitations were such as strongly to indicate that actual adultery had been committed, the wife had been exemplary in her conduct for ten years, was carried to Lisle, and

left there by the husband, and during these ten years he was using all means to seduce, almost to force, the maid-servants, three of whom denied the adultery; the fourth refused to answer, the Court doubted whether that might have been sufficient to have entitled the wife to a sentence of separation; but under all the circumstances they held the husband barred of his remedy, Forster v. Forster, 1 Hagg. c. 144. In a suit for divorce by reason of adultery, recrimination of adultery upon the complaining party is equally a bar if proved, whether such adultery have been committed before or after a voluntary separation has taken place and before or after the delinquency. of the other party, Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hagg. C. 299, and semble even if committed after the commencement of the suit; and in Brisco v. Brisco, 2 Add. 264, the Court still more distinctly inclined to the opinion that the husband's delinquency at any time prior to sentence will bar his claim to a separation.

Where the adultery was fully proved, but not consummation of the marriage, the general result of the evidence seeming to be that the woman would not allow consummation, but immediately eloped with the adulterer, the Court pronounced for the divorce without hearing counsel in support of it, being clearly of opinion that this is no bar, Patrick v. Patrick, 3 Phill. 496. Compensatio criminum need not be pleaded specially; the wife

is entitled to the full benefit of any evidence adduced by the husband which creates such a bar, Timmings v. Timmings, 3 Hagg. 77; but a party relying on condonation as a bar should plead it, Ibid, 84.

Where adultery is pleaded by way of recrimination, and as a bar, it is not necessary to prove such strong facts against the plaintiff as would be required to convict the other party in a suit for divorce, Leicester v. Leicester, cited 1 Hagg. Con. 153, and quoted and the principle affirmed in Astley v. Astley, 1 Hagg 721.

It is not a good plea in bar to a petition for a dissolution of marriage that the respondent had been dismissed from a suit in the Arches' Court for a divorce a mensâ et thoro, for that suit was not de eadem re, and, therefore, this is not a case in which lis alibi pendens is a good plea; and this Court is not bound by the standing orders of the House of Lords, according to which a dissolution could not be obtained where the husband had failed to obtain a divorce a mensâ; and for the same reasons the pendency of an appeal from the Arches Court is not pleadable in such a case: Evans v. Evans and Robinson, 27 L. J., P. & M. 57.

Entering into a voluntary deed of separation and bringing an action upon that deed does not bar the wife of her remedy by separation nor bear unfavourably on her case: Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. 760.