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1830 in possession of what passed during my stay there, on the object of my Journey.

I had two interviews with M. Verstolk, at which I received an explanation of the causes which still closed the Port of Antwerp to all commerce or communication. From the information he gave me, I found that when the King of The Netherlands send Ordres to take off the Blockade, he directed his Naval Commanders to shut the Scheldt, the result of which measure is absolutely the same as that of a strict Blockade. M. Verstolk, in justification of this proceeding, stated, that when His Majesty took off the Blockade, things returned to the state in which they were previous to its establishment; that on the 20th of October last, the Kiug, by a Decree, forbade all communica tion with the insurgent Provinces; that the Blockade was only put on, on the 7th of November; that now, therefore, the navigation was subject to the regulations of the Decree of the 20th of October; and that consequently, Orders had been send to the Naval Commanders to prevent Vessels crossing their naval milia tary line established at the mouth of the Scheldt. M. Verstolk maintained His Majesty had a perfect right A to enforce this measures; that it was not an act of hostility, and could not therefore be affected by the su spension of hostilities to which His Majesty had agreed, and which he had faithfully executed.

I represented to M. Verstolk, that I doubted much, whether, when the Plenipotentiaries decided that the Blockade must be taken off, or the suspension of hostilities being acceded to by both Parties, they ever contemplated that His Netherland Majesty would take other measures by which the effects of the Blockade would in fact be maintained, and which rendered the raising of a Blockade perfectly illusory; His Excellency refused to enter into the question with me, as he said His Majesty had determined to refer the question to the Plenipotentiaries in London, who would decide whether His Majesty was justified or not, in adopting he considered necessary for the defence of his own Dominions.

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I represented to M. Verstolk, that I was afraid, from the disposition in which I lest the Congress, that the explanation I had received would be very

far from satisfactory; and I could not conceal from 1830 him, that it would certainly add to the irritation, which was already excessive when I left Brussels, on account of what was considered to be the violation of the suspension of hostilities on the part of the King. That at such a moment it might operate most perniciously on the progress of the Negotiations, and perhaps cause the rupture of them altogether. His Excellency always replied, that the King was in no hurry for a termination; that he did not fear the result even of a rupture; and that he would wait the decision of the Plenipotentiaries in London on this difference.

With this explanation I said I should return to Brussels, though, as to opening the Port of Antwerp, it left matters just where they had been, but I explained to M. Verstolk, that I had come to The Hague to obtain explanation, because my Colleague and myself had been left in total ignorance of the reasons which still rendered the navigation of the Scheldt impracticable; that the Dutch Government had placed us in a very embarrassing position, from the reserve which had been evinced towards us on this subject, and which had made us appear, either as having led the Provisional Government into error, or as having been deceived ourselves; that we thought, therefore, we had some just ground to complain.

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This difficulty, which has impeded, and still impedes, the Negotiation, your Lordship and the Plenipotentiaries have probably already under deliberation, and it remains for their Excellencies to decide, whether the conduct of the Dutch Government has been just and candid. It was decided by the Plenipotentiaries, that the Blockade should be raised on the suspension of hostilities, because it was an act of hostility, and His Netherland Majesty then takes measures within his grasp, which render the effect to be produced by the raising of that Blockade, totaly nugatory.

The greatest anxiety is manifested here for the decision of the Plenipotentiaries, because, suspicions as the Belgians have been all along of partiality on their part towards the King, if His Majesty is permitted, by such subterfuges, to counteract the measures to which he stands engaged, they fear, that,

1830 when they shall have accepted the Protocol, in extenso, they may still further be subjected to vexatious proceedings on the part of the Dutch Government.

I have now the honour to close my Correspondence with your Lordship on the subject of these Negotiations, and trust, that my conduct during these latter transactions will meet with the approbation of His Majesty's Government..

I have the honour, etc.

THOMAS CARTWRIGHT.

E.

Lettre de Lord Ponsonby au Vicomte de Palmerston.

My Lord,

Brussels, 7th December 1830.

I enclose herewith Copy of a verbal Note, sent on the 6th instant, conjointly by Monsieur Bresson and myself, to the Committee for Foreign Affairs, declaring our inability to give any definitive explanation of the character of the late proceedings of the Government of His Majesty the King of The Netherlands, in issuing Orders proscribing the free passage of Vessels up the Scheldt to Antwerp, and referring the question to the decision of the Conference at London.

Your Lordship will observe, also, our Statement, in reply to a Note from the Committee for Foreign Affairs, of the 25th November, respecting the position in which the Belgic Flag appears to us to be placed at the present juncture.

I have the honour, etc.

PONSONBY.

Pièces annexées à la lettre de Lord Ponsonby au Vicomte de Palmerston, du 7 Décembre 1830.

I.

Note verbale adressée par le gouvernement belge à M. M. Cartwright et Bresson.

Bruxelles, le 5 Deembre 1830. Le gouvernement de la Belgique, en recevant la nouvelle de la levée du Blocus par les Hollandais, a senti qu'un des premiers besoins du Commerce Belge est la reconnaisance du Pavillon national.

En effet, la libre navigation sur les mers et les 1830 fleuves, résultat nécessaire de cette levée du Blocus, deviendroit illusoire pour les negocians de la Belgique, s'ils étaient placés dans l'alternative ou d'arborer le Pavillon ennemi, qu'ils ne doivent ni ne peuvent adopter, ou de sortir de nos ports sans Pavillon reconnu, ce qui semblerait les assimiler à des forbans.

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En présentant cette observation à M. M. Cartwright et Bresson, le Gouvernement Belge n'élève pas le moindre doute sur la reconnaisance du Pavillon national de la Belgique par les 5 grandes Puissances, qui ont offert leur bienveillante médiation dans la proposition d'Armistice, mais il croit devoir insister auprès des Agens Diplomatiques de ces mêmes Puissances, pour qu'elles fassent reconnaitre et respecter le Pavillon Belge par les Hollandais.

Le Gouvernement Belge espère que, par une prompte Réponse à la Note qu'on a l'honneur de présenter, M. M. Cartwright et Bresson voudront bien le mettre à même de calmer les inquiétudes que le Commerce éprouve sur ce point important.

II.

Note verbale adressée par les Commissaires de la conférence de Londres (Lord Ponsonby et M. Bresson) au gouvernement belge.

Bruxelles, le 6 Décembre 1830.

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Les faits contenus dans la Note du 3 Décembre ont soulevé une question qui n'était pas prévue. I serait difficile que la solution en pût être donnée à Bruxelles d'une manière complette et satisfaisante, et ila paru nécessaire de s'en référer à la Conférence de Londres. La Note a été transmise en conséquence, par le Courrier de Samedi, 4 Décembre, et la déci~ sion pourra arriver avant la fin de la présente semaine. En réponse à la Note reçue sous la date du 25 Novembre, il semble naturel' de conclure, que pendant une suspension d'armes ou un Armistice, le Pavillon de l'une des deux parties ne pourrait être inqiuété par l'autre, sans qu'il y'eût hostilité commise.

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Lettre de Lord Ponsonby au Vicomte de Palmerston, en date du 7 Décembre 1830.

1.

My Lord,

Brussels, 7th December 1830.

I have the honour herewith to inclose Copy of a Verbal Note, sent in yesterday, conjointly by Monsieur Bresson and myself.

Your Lordship will observe, that this Note contains the explanation given by the Conference of the 5 Great: Powers, of the meaning affixed by them to the Article No. 2 of the Protocol of the 17th Novemberz 1830.

Ishave, etc.
have,etc.

(Incluse.)

PONSONBY.

Note verbale adressée par Lord Ponsonby et M. Bresson au gouvernement belge, en date du 6 Décembre 1830.

Bruxelles, le 6 Décembre 1830. Le gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique a demandé quelle signification précise les Plénipotentiaires des 5 Puissances attachent à l'Article 2 du Protocole du 17 Novembre, 1830.

Cet Article dit que l'Armistice, étant convenu de part et d'autre, constitue un engagement pris envers les 5, Puissances.

Le Gouvernement Belge a parfaitement compris, et il l'a exprimé dans la Note à laquelle on répond, la nature de la démarche des Puissances, qu'il qualifie de démarche amicale de médiateurs animés d'un esprit de concorde et de paix. C'est précisément parceque tel est l'esprit de leur démarche, et afin que l'effet en soit sûr et placé hors d'atteinte, que les 5 Puissances ont jugé utile de rendre l'Armistice indéfini, et de le considérer comme un engagement pris envers elles-mêmes, et à l'exécution duquel il leur appartient désormais de veiller....

Le but des 5 Puissances est d'éteindre tout sentiment d'inimitié entre les populations que divise en ce moment une lutte déplorable, et non d'en faire prévoir le retour.

Cet engagement porte spécialement sur l'Armistice,

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