1830 himself to the Representatives of Constitutional Powers, he should be perfectly understood when he assured us, that there were points beyond which it was impossible for the King to go with safety to himself; that he did not disguise from us that the Northern Provinces of the Kingdom were already in that state of exasperation against the Belgians, that the smallest sacrifices which might now be made to them would infallibly turn that exasperation against the King's Government, and lead to consequences of which no Person, who had not the same knowledge that he had of the character of the Dutch People when once excited, could form any adequate idea; that, after the immense sacrifices which the Northern Provinces had already made, and were still making, for their own defence, and in the enthusiasm which prevailed throughout the whole Country, and the fixed determination which there was to bring itself back, at all hazard, to its ancient condition, and to separate itself totally, and for ever, from all connexion with the Belgian Terri tory, the King was no longer in a situation in which he could venture to yield, upon his own responsability, one iota more to the demands of his rebellious Subjects in the South, at the expence of what might be considered purely Dutch interests.

The Belgians, he said, had already distinctly declared, that, in accepting the Armistice, they had taken no engagement whatever towards the 5 Powers, while the 5 Powers had, on their part, given no sort of guarantee that that Armistice, when once accepted, should be enforced; and that it would therefore be the height of imprudence in the King to forego, in this state of things, a single advantage which he might be able to command, for the security of what remained to him of his Dominions.

In answer to these observations, we did not fail to remind M. de Verstolk, that the demand of an Armitice was originally made to the 5 Powers by the King himself, and that the circumstance of his being now in a stronger attitude than he was at the moment when the demand was made, did not make it less binding upon him, in prudence as well as in good faith, to carry it into effect on his part in the most loyal and unreserved manner, and we earnestly entreated him

to consider that, however easy it might be to defend 1830 in argument, and under a strict interpretation of National Law, the distinction taken between the removal of the Blockade of the mouth of the Scheldt, and the liberty to navigate its waters for commercial purposes, such distinction had been entirely unexpected, was but little understood, and would, if persisted in, certainly afford to the Belgians a plausible pretext for flying, if it should appear to them to be their interest to do so, from those engagements to which they were at this moment, but after much difficulty, upon the point of being irrevocably bound.

M. de Verstolck concluded a long conversation of which I have given your Lordship merely an outline, by saying, that he could only receive what we then said, for reference to the King; and on the following day he gave me, by the King's desire, the answer which is reported in my preceding Despatch.

There may be, and undoubtedly there is, some exaggeration in the representation made by M. de Verstolk of the present state of the public temper in this Country; there can, however, be no question that, within these few weeks, a national feeling has arisen here which is so strong, so anti- Belgian, and exclusively Dutch, that it certainly - behoves the King to be extremly circumspect in every measure which he adopts, especially as regards the Belgians. The Country is making great efforts and great sacrifices, but, they are evidently not unconditional, and the maintenance of the King's Authority is a secondary consideration to that of absolute and perpetual separation from the Southern Provinces, and a return to their ancient independence, under whatever system of Go

vernment.

The sum of 352,000 florins was unanimously voted on Saturday last for the extraordinary expences of the War Department, and the voluntary contributions making throughout the Country for the service of the State, already amount to a very considerable sum.

I have, etc..

CHARLES BAGOT.

1830

XIX.

Extrait d'une lettre de Lord Palmerston à Sir Charles Bagot à la Haye, en date du 7 Dẻcembre 1830.

London, Foreign Office, 7th December, 1830.

Immediately upon the receipt of your Excellency's Despatch of the 3rd instant, which reached me yesterday, I requested a meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of the 5 Powers, and they accordingly assembled at the Foreign Office yesterday. The result of the deliberation was, that M. Falk was requested to write by today's post to his Court, to inform them, that the Conference had fearnt with regret the difficulty which had been started by the King of The Netherlands, upon the subject of the Blockade of Antwerp, and, in consequence of which, the Negotiations at Brussels for the Armistice had been suspended, at the very moment when the Belgian Authorities were on the point of agreeing to the term required by our Commissioners, that we regretted this the more, as the faith of the Allied Powers had, in some degree, been pledged to the Belgians on this subject, that the Conference trusted that, on further consideration, the King would be induced immediately to suspend the further execution of this Arrêté, and that his not doingso would create embarrassments of the most serious nature.

I cannot help hoping that, before this Despatch reaches your Excellency, the King of The Netherlands will have seen reason to alter his determination; but if, unfortunately, this should not have happened, and the Blockade of the Scheldt should still be in force, it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that you will immediately renew your remonstrances upon this subject.

You will remind the Dutch Government, that, in consequence of an official. intimation by the Dutch Ambassador at this Court, the Plenipotentiaries of the 5 Powers assembled in Conference, authorized their Commissioners at Brussels to state to the Provisional Government there, that, upon a suspension of arms, all hostilities by sea and by land on the part of Holland would cease, and that the same assurance was

also conveyed to the Commissioners by a Letter from 1830 yourself.

That this assurance was one great inducement held out by the Commissioners to the Belgians, to persuade them to accede to the armistice; and that if, after the Belgians, on their part, had discontinued all hostilities, and when they had almost agreed to the terms of the Armistice and to the Line of Demarcation required, this assurance is to be broken through by the King, not the King only, but the 5 Allied Powers also. will be exposed to the charge of having broken their faith,

It is unterstood to have been alleged by the Dutch Government, that the undertaking to raise Blockades meant only Blockades by sea, and did not include Blockades of Rivers. But, His Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that His Majesty the King of the Netherlands can have given his sanction to such a distinction as this; and to such an argument, therefore, I do not think it necessary to suggest any serious answer.

It

appears from your Excellency's Despatch, that M. de Verstolk stated to you that the Blockade had been raised, but that upon the cessation of the Blockade, there came again into operation a previous Arrété, promulgated, I believe, in October, and which, prohibiting all intercourse between the faithful and the revolted Subjects of the King of the Netherlands, was applicable to river as well as to land com

munication.

To this it is to be observed, that such an Arrêté was either a measure of hostility against the King's revolted Subjects, or a measure of precautionary police bearing upon his then faithful Subjects, and intended to preserve them from infectious contact with those who were in a state of insurrection.

If it was a measure of hostility, arising out of the civil War which then raged between the King and the Belgians, it is obvious that it ought to cease, the moment it has been agreed that hostilities shall be suspended on both sides.

If it was a

measure of precautionary police, it could only be applicable to the King's Subjects, and the Belgians are now, by the force of events, no lon

18:30 ger his Subjects de facto, and the Arrêté cannot, therefore, be applicable to them; but further than this, a great many of the Ships detained at Flushing are Foreigners, and upon what possible plea can a police regulation of the King, applicable to his own Subjects, be made an obstacle to prevent English, French, and American Ships from entering the Belgian Port of Antwerp?

If it is contended that, previous to the conquest of Holland by France, the navigation of the Scheldt was closed, it is to be stated in reply, that during the interval which elapsed between the execution of the Treaty of Paris, by the evacuation of Antwerp by the French Forces, and the final union of Belgium with Holland, the navigation of that River to Antwerp was open, subject only to the payment of a moderate toll; and that, by the first Protocol of the Conferences, the 2 contending Parties were to be replaced, by the Armistice, as nearly as possible in the relative situations in which they stood in 1814, previous to

their union.

To say that the Blockade has been raised while the Arrété continues, is only a play upon words, and not an alteration of things; and if it is argued that the Arrêté is not a measure of hostility, it may be well to ask by what means except the threat, or the actual employment of force, (that is, by hostility,) the observance of the Arrété can be compelled.

Your Excellency will urge upon Dutch Government, in the strongest manner, the indispensable necessity of casting aside all gratuitous difficulties of this Kind, and of affording to the Allies a cordial cooperation in their endeavours to bring, by their mediation, the contest between Holland and Belgium to the spediest possible adjustment.

XX.

PALMERSTON.

Cinquième protocole de la Conférence de Londres, du 10 Décembre 1830.

Présens: Les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche; de France; de la Grande Bretagne; des Pays-Bas; de Prusse; et de Russie;